

# Industrial Embedded Systems

## - Design for Harsh Environment -

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Part VII

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Technical University Munich (TUM)

# Agenda

Today:


ADD for PMU (Architecture and Detailed Design)

Testing

Recap:


- Architecture – High Level Design (Software)

# V-Model



# Architecture

## - System View (HW and SW)-



# Architecture and Detailed Design


## - System View-

- Hardware and software two different disciplines executed in parallel during detailed design, implementation, and unit testing.
- Disciplines get together again at integration testing stage (HW and SW integration).
- HW design:
  - Architectural blocks (see previous slide) transferred into CAD tool.
  - Larger components get selected
  - Detailed circuit design, simulation, reliability calculations
- SW design:
  - Architectural blocks get refined (could happen in same tool – but only makes sense for auto-coding)
  - Detailed object design (function, data)

# Hardware

## - Bill Of Material (BOM) -

Function	Device	Size	Voltage	Number
PMU control	Microchip dsPIC33FJ128GP710	14x14x1 mm (TQFP-100)	3.3V	1
pressure 4-20mA screw terminal	Phoenix Contact MKDSN 1.5/2-5.08	8.1x10.2x10 mm	NA	1
24V DC power screw terminal	Phoenix Contact MKDSN 1.5/2-5.08	8.1x10.2x10 mm	NA	2
PT100 3 wire screw terminal	Phoenix Contact MKDSN 1.5/3-5.08	8.1x15.3x10 mm	NA	1
RS232 D-sub 9 receptical	Tyco Electronics 747844-5	12.6x30.8x12.5 mm	NA	1
CAN D-sub 9 receptical	Tyco Electronics 747844-5	12.6x30.8x12.5 mm	NA	1
PT100 current source	National Semiconductor LM317	5x6.2x1.8 mm (SO-8)	5V	1
PT100 signal conditioning OpAmp	LT1097	5x6.2x1.8 mm (SO-8)	5V	1
RS232 physical line driver	MAX221	5x6.2x1.5 mm (SSOP-16)	5V	1
CAN transceiver	TI SN65HVD234	5x6.2x1.8 mm (SO-8)	3.3V	1
8.000MHz CRYSTAL 20pf	tbd	11.8x5.5x2.5 mm	3.3V	1
on-board temperature	Microcip TC1047	2.7x3.1x1.2 mm	3.3V	1
Watchdog (windowed) and voltage supervision	MAX6324	3x3.1x1.5 mm (SOT23)	3.3/5V	2
power supply	LT3645	3.5x3.5x0.8 mm	24V	1





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

# Hardware Ctd.

- BOM of big parts see previous slide. Small parts (resistors, capacitors, diodes, etc.) missing.
  - Calculated area: 1481 mm<sup>2</sup>
  - Target area: 1250 mm<sup>2</sup> physical PCB size (PMUSysRQ 20)
- We could stay with selected components or try to minimize area of connectors (especially D-sub)
- Hardware designer figures out right components (requirements defined) and their interconnection:
  - Data sheets
  - White papers and application notes
  - Documents that come with eval boards (schematics, BOM)
  - Test setups and/or simulation

# Hardware Ctd.



Source: microchip.com, ti.com and linear.com



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# Design Reliability

- Reliability is generally related to a function. Therefore, we can either calculate a reliability for our main function („measure pressure“) or the safety function („communicate pressure limit violation“)
  - Reliability looks at all failure modes ( $\lambda$ )
  - Safety looks at dangerous failure modes ( $\lambda_d$ )
- IEC61508 requires a safety-related system either to be high-demand or low-demand. The demand mode determines if a PFD or PFH metric is used to show quantitative safety integrity
  - High-demand: in general safety integrity is associated with the failure rate of the safety function (a failure always results in a hazardous system state )
  - Low-demand: integrity is associated with the failure rate and the MDT (unavailability) caused by the failure (a failure not necessarily results in a hazardous system state since the failure might be dormant)

# Determination of $\lambda_d$

- FMEDA (Failure Mode Effects and Diagnostic Analysis)
  - Take one block (a collection of electronics components)
  - Input:  $\lambda$  values taken from literature (see lecture #2 - literature) or IC vendors
  - Each failure mode ( $\lambda$ ) can be safe or dangerous from a safety perspective ( $\lambda_d$  and  $\lambda_s$ )
  - A dangerous component failure can be transferred to a safe failure by the concept of DC (see lecture #VI – fault detection)
  - Output:  $\lambda_d$ ,  $\lambda_s$ ,  $\lambda_{du}$ ,  $\lambda_{dd}$ , SFF (qualification of architecture)
- Use  $\lambda_d$  in RBD or FTA to combine different blocks to system
- $\lambda_d$  used to calculate PFH (PMU is a high-demand system)
- SFF used to qualify architecture (SFF and HW fault tolerance) for a SIL


# FMEDA Example

Component Reference	Description	safety relevant	$\lambda_{total}$ (FIT)	Failure mode	Failure kind	Failure distribution (%)	$\lambda_s$ (FIT)	$\lambda_d$ (FIT)	DC	$\lambda_{dd}$ (FIT)	$\lambda_{du}$ (FIT)
R1	resistor	yes	5	short	dangerous	50	NA	2,5	0	0	2,5
				open	safe	50	2,5	NA	0	NA	NA
U2	ADC	yes	1000	stuck-at	dangerous	50	NA	500	90	450	50
				drift	dangerous	50	NA	500	60	300	200
sum								1002,5		750	252,5


- We use simple spreadsheet – there are some tools out there (TUV, exida)
- $\lambda_{total} = \lambda_{du} + \lambda_{dd} + \lambda_{sd} + \lambda_{su}$
- $DC = \sum \lambda_{dd} / \sum \lambda_d$  (see lecture#6 - fault detection)
- $\lambda_{dd} = \lambda_d \times DC / 100$  (see lecture#6 - fault detection)
- $\lambda_{du} = \lambda_d \times (1 - DC / 100)$
- $SFF = 1 - \sum \lambda_{du} / \sum \lambda_{total}$

# PMU Example

- From requirements analysis:



- We focus on one block (pressure) or a part of it:



# PMU Example Ctd.

Component Reference	Description	safety relevant	$\lambda_{total}$ (FIT)	Failure mode	Failure kind	Failure distribution (%)	$\lambda_s$ (FIT)	$\lambda_d$ (FIT)	DC	$\lambda_{dd}$ (FIT)	$\lambda_{du}$ (FIT)
R1	resistor	yes	0,05	short	dangerous	10					
				open	dangerous	90					
R2	resistor	yes	0,05	short	dangerous	10					
				open	dangerous	90					
C1	capacitor	yes	2	short	dangerous	30					
				open	dangerous	30					
				drift	dangerous	40					
C2	capacitor	yes	2	short	dangerous	30					
				open	dangerous	30					
				drift	dangerous	40					
D1	diode	yes	10	short	dangerous	50					
				open	dangerous	50					
D2	diode	yes	10	short	dangerous	50					
				open	dangerous	50					

- Now: determination of  $\lambda_d$  and  $\lambda_s$

# PMU Example Ctd.

Component Reference	Description	safety relevant	$\lambda_{total}$ (FIT)	Failure mode	Failure kind	Failure distribution (%)	$\lambda_s$ (FIT)	$\lambda_d$ (FIT)	DC	$\lambda_{dd}$ (FIT)	$\lambda_{du}$ (FIT)
R1	resistor	yes	0,05	short	dangerous	10	NA	0,005			
				open	dangerous	90	NA	0,045			
R2	resistor	yes	0,05	short	dangerous	10	NA	0,005			
				open	dangerous	90	NA	0,045			
C1	capacitor	yes	2	short	dangerous	30	NA	0,6			
				open	dangerous	30	NA	0,6			
				drift	dangerous	40	NA	0,8			
C2	capacitor	yes	2	short	dangerous	30	NA	0,6			
				open	dangerous	30	NA	0,6			
				drift	dangerous	40	NA	0,8			
D1	diode	yes	10	short	dangerous	50	NA	5			
				open	dangerous	50	NA	5			
D2	diode	yes	10	short	dangerous	50	NA	5			
				open	dangerous	50	NA	5			

- Now: determination of  $\lambda_{dd}$  and  $\lambda_{du}$  given a DC

# PMU Example Ctd.

Component Reference	Description	safety relevant	$\lambda_{total}$ (FIT)	Failure mode	Failure kind	Failure distribution (%)	$\lambda_s$ (FIT)	$\lambda_d$ (FIT)	DC	$\lambda_{dd}$ (FIT)	$\lambda_{du}$ (FIT)
R1	resistor	yes	0,05	short	dangerous	10	NA	0,005	0	0	0,005
				open	dangerous	90	NA	0,045	0	0	0,045
R2	resistor	yes	0,05	short	dangerous	10	NA	0,005	0	0	0,005
				open	dangerous	90	NA	0,045	0	0	0,045
C1	capacitor	yes	2	short	dangerous	30	NA	0,6	0	0	0,6
				open	dangerous	30	NA	0,6	0	0	0,6
				drift	dangerous	40	NA	0,8	0	0	0,8
C2	capacitor	yes	2	short	dangerous	30	NA	0,6	0	0	0,6
				open	dangerous	30	NA	0,6	0	0	0,6
				drift	dangerous	40	NA	0,8	0	0	0,8
D1	diode	yes	10	short	dangerous	50	NA	5	0	0	5
				open	dangerous	50	NA	5	0	0	5
D2	diode	yes	10	short	dangerous	50	NA	5	0	0	5
				open	dangerous	50	NA	5	0	0	5

- This was a simple example using passive electronics components only
- Every component has been labeled relevant to safety and the total FIT ratings have been made up – in reality they depend on the mission profile

# Complex Components

- Complex components (e.g. embedded processors) failure rates are not publically available
- Failure rates need to be determined based on IC vendor information
- If a total failure rate is know the failure rate for a specific functionality can be determined using a transistor count method:


Base FIT	component	% of transistors	component FIT
10000	Flash	50,9	5090
	RAM	30	3000
	ADC	3	300

- Not used components do not contribute



# Calculating PFD/PFH

- Calculation of PFD/PFH depends on the system architecture (# channels)
- In general this is a complex exercise (depending on the system architecture) which needs the system dangerous failure rates as calculated in the FMEDA (needs to be done for all components)
- PMU (a 1oo1D architecture):  $PFH = \lambda_{du}$



# Meeting the Requirements again - Watch out for HW Requirements -

Document No.	Prep By	IN2244	R							Sheet 1
	AWH	System Requirements Specification - PMU	E							Of 12
			V							
			E							
			C							
			N							

## System Requirements Specification

for


## Pressure Measurement Unit (PMU)

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Preliminary Information

# Architecture

## - System View (once again)-





# Software

## - Object List-

- Pressure interface – interface to peripheral ADC
- CAN interface – external request via ECAN peripheral
- Temperature compensation – interface to peripheral ADC
- LED interface for health status – GPIO
- Configuration – RS232
- On-board temperature – peripheral ADC
- Start-up diagnostics – CPU, RAM, Flash, ADC, CAN
- Background diagnostics – CPU, RAM, Flash
- Scheduling

# Software Ctd.



Task 1 runs in an interrupt context (cyclic)  
Task 2 runs in an interrupt context (not cyclic)  
Fault detection runs in a background loop

# Schedulability

- 3 tasks:
  - Interrupt context – no cycle time (C1), response time < 100ns (R1)
  - Interrupt context – 100ms cycle time (C2), response time 10ms (R2)
  - Background context – 3s cycle time (C3), response time 900ms (R3)
  - Independent, static priorities (high, low)
  - Rate Monotonic Scheduling (RMS) – assign priority depending on cycle times (we have done that already without too much thinking)
- Worst case schedulability:  $W_n = n \times (2^{1/n} - 1)$
- Always confirm:  $\sum_i \frac{R_i}{C_i} \leq n \times (2^{1/n} - 1)$
- Here we get:  $0.4 \leq 0.83$

# Meeting the Requirements again - Watch out for SW Requirements -

Document No.	Prep By	IN2244	R							Sheet 1
	AWH	System Requirements Specification - PMU	E							Of 12
			V							
			E							
			C							
			N							

## System Requirements Specification

for

## Pressure Measurement Unit (PMU)

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Preliminary Information

# PMU Architecture and Design Description

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	AWH	Architecture and Detailed Design - PMU								

## Architecture and Detailed Design

for

## Pressure Measurement Unit (PMU)

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Preliminary Information

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# Software Unit (Module) Testing (based on IEC61508-3)

Technique/Measure	Ref	SIL3	Interpretation for PMU
Static analysis	B.6.4 (IEC61508-7) Table B.8 (IEC61508-3)	HR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- automated coding standard compliance tests</li> <li>- design reviews</li> <li>- program not executed</li> </ul>
Functional analysis (dynamic/black-box)	B.5.1 (IEC61508-7) B.5.2 (IEC61508-7) Table B.3 (IEC61508-3)	HR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- test against design document</li> <li>- program is executed</li> <li>- boundary value analysis, equivalence classes and input partitioning</li> </ul> <p><b>Test Environment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PMU + test harness (I/O)+ PC software (analysis)</li> </ul>
Structural analysis (dynamic/white box)	B.6.5 (IEC61508-7) Table B.2 IEC61508-3)	HR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Test against design document and code</li> <li>- Boundary value analysis, performance testing equivalence classes and input partitioning (100% branch coverage).</li> </ul> <p><b>Test Environment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Same as functional analysis</li> </ul>
Data recording and analysis	C.5.2 (IEC61508-7)	HR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All testing needs to be documented. Pass/fail criteria need to be in place.</li> </ul>

# HW/SW Integration (based on IEC61508-3)

Technique/Measure	Ref	SIL3	Interpretation for PMU
Functional analysis (task level + framework)	B.5.1 (IEC61508-7) B.5.2 (IEC61508-7) Table B.3 (IEC61508-3)	HR	<p><b>Tests against architecture and design:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- boundary value analysis, equivalence classes and input partitioning (at least one per equivalence class)</li> <li>- Test cases need to cover input, output boundaries and extreme values. Test cases which drive the output to exceed the specification need to be considered</li> </ul> <p><b>Test Environment:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PMU + test harness (I/O)+ PC software (analysis)</li> </ul>
Data recording and analysis	C.5.2 (IEC61508-7)	HR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All testing needs to be documented. Pass/fail criteria need to be in place.</li> </ul>
Performance testing	C.5.20 (IEC61508-7) Table B.6 (IEC61508-3)	HR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Avalanche/stress testing</li> <li>- high CAN request load, highest sampling rate</li> <li>• Response timings and memory constraints – analysis of the resource usage and elapsed time for every PMU functionality.</li> <li>• Fault insertion testing</li> </ul>

# System Testing

Technique/Measure	Ref	SIL3	Interpretation for PMU
Simulation/modelling	Table B.5 (IEC61508-3)	HR	Comparison of simulated and real readings.
Functional and non-function testing against requirements (real IO, real environment)	B.5.1 (IEC61508-7) B.5.2 (IEC61508-7) Table B.3 (IEC61508-3)	HR	<b>Test against requirements:</b> - boundary value analysis, equivalence classes and input partitioning <b>Test Environment:</b> - PMU + pressure sensor + PC software (CAN master)